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IVORY TOWER OR HOLY MOUNTAIN? FAITH AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM 
Reprinted with permission from the January/February 2001 issue of Academe 
Nicholas Wolterstorff 
Is it wrong for a college or university to attach religious 
qualifications to the academic freedom of its faculty? 
Before I answer that question, let me explain what I take 
academic freedom to be. Perhaps it's easiest to see what it 
is by considering what constitutes an infringement on it. 
Infringing on a professor's academic freedom consists of 
impairing, or threatening to impair, her academic position 
or standing in some way or the other: firing her or 
threatening to fire her, refusing to promote her or 
threatening to refuse to promote her, preventing her from 
serving on important committees or threatening to prevent 
her from so serving, rejecting her candidacy for some post 
or threatening to reject it, and so forth. 
But of course many such impairments or threats do not 
constitute infringements on academic freedom. What has 
to be added is something about the grounds for the actual 
or threatened impairment. Infringement of academic 
freedom typically happens when the actual or threatened 
impairment occurs on account of the person's position on 
some issue, or on account of her publicizing her position. 
This issue may or may not be within the person's academic 
field; it's all too usual for the threat to be issued on account 
of the person's position on some religious or political issue. 
The fact that te academy has to make judgements of 
competence requires that we say more than just that, 
however. For an infringement of academic freedom to 
occur, the impairment of a person's academic standing has 
to based on some other aspect of the positions he holds 
rather than their scholarly competence or incompetence. It 
has to be based on what I shall call the ideological content 
of his position. If the university refuses to promote some 
young professor because of the scholarly incompetence of 
the positions he holds, although it would be impairing his 
academic standing on account of certain of his positions, 
such impairment would not constitute infringement on the 
person's academic freedom. 
The distinction between disapproving of the ideological 
content of what a person says and judging it incompetent 
is, of course, fraught with difficulty in application. Not 
that the distinction can never be confidently drawn; 
certainly it can be. Nonetheless, those who talk as if the 
several academic guilds--the guild of historians, the guild 
of philosophers, and so on--have arrived at ideologically 
neutral criteria of competence, and if it's easy to 
distinguish the employment of these from ideological 
discrimination, seem to me to be living in a fantasyland. 
Let me now join together the two components of what it is 
to infringe on a person's academic freedom to which I have 
called attention: to infringe on a person's academic 
freedom is to impair or threaten to impair that person's 
position or standing in the academy on account of the 
ideological content of the position she holds or publicizes 
on some issue. 
QUALIFIED FREEDOM 
In practice, the right to academic freedom is no more 
absolute than the civil liberty of free speech. The 
formulation concerning free speech in the U.S. Bill of 
Rights is absolute, but if one looks at a law that emerges 
from judicial decisions having to do with free speech, it's 
clear that the free speech is a qualified liberty. Judges 
address the facts of the cases before them, and the law 
emerges from their decisions. 
The same sort of thing is true for academic freedom; it is 
no more absolute than is the civil liberty of free speech. 
The guideline for the practice of the academy is not the 
stark formulation I offered above, but that formulation as 
duly qualified. 
When a court declares that it is acceptable for the 
government to impose some restriction on a person's 
speech, is the court saying it's acceptable for the 
government to infringe on free speech? That falls strange 
on the ear; the connotation on infringe suggests that 
infringing on someone's right is a bad thing to do. Better 
to say that the court's decisions function to qualify a 
freedom. I shall speak of academic freedom in the same 
way. Although it's never a good thing to infringe on 
academic freedom, every educational institution does and 
should attach qualifications to that freedom. The issue will 
always be which qualifications are appropriate. 
EIGHT CONSIDERATIONS 
In considering academic freedom in religiously based 
institutions, I can think of eight considerations that seem 
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necessary or useful to bear in mind. Some of these 
considerations relate to the social setting in which we deal 
with the issue of academic freedom; others are matters of 
semiphilosophical background. 
Modern Society 
In the first place, questions of academic freedom arise for 
us within the context of a modernized society that 
recognizes distinct spheres of social and cultural life. 
Some of my readers will understand that I am alluding to 
Max Weber's theory of modernization; because I cannot 
assume that all are familiar with the theory, let me say just 
a word about it. 
Weber saw the essence of modernization in the emergence 
of differentiated spheres of activity--specifically, the social 
spheres of the economy, state, and household, and the 
cultural spheres of academic learning (Wissenschaft), art, 
law, and ethics. Weber claimed that the dynamic of 
rationalization, after disenchanting the world and confining 
the ethic of brotherliness to the realm of the private, 
brought these spheres to the light of day by differentiating 
them from each other and securing the relative 
independence of action within them from outside influence. 
Whether or not Weber was right to claim that 
rationalization accounts for the differentiation of spheres is 
not relevant to the subject matters at hand. What is 
relevant, however, is the basic claim that modernized 
societies--of which ours is certainly one--are characterized 
by such differentiation. For it is only in such societies that 
the issue of academic freedom, in anything like the form it 
takes for us, can arise. 
Weber's assertion that, spurred on by rationalization, life 
within the differentiated spheres follows its own inherent 
laws unless distorted by outside influence is something I 
will return to later. 
Religious Pluralism and Democracy 
Second, the issue of academic freedom arises for us not 
only within a modernized society, but also within a 
religiously pluralistic one within a liberal democratic 
polity. The liberal democratic from of polity emerged in 
the West as a solution to the problem of social order posed 
when the citizens of a single state embraced a diversity of 
incompatible comprehensive perspectives on God and the 
good--some of these perspectives being religious, some 
not. A liberal polity accords to its citizens such ci 
liberties as freedom of conscience, freedom to exerci 
one's religion, freedom of speech, and freedom 
assembly. And it refrains from indoctrinating its citize 
into any comprehensive religious or philosophic 
perspective; it treats impartially all the comprehensi 
perspectives to be found in the society. 
Civil Society 
Third, the issue of academic freedom arises for us within 
a society that exhibits extraordinary scope and vitality in its 
civil dimension. Totalitarian regimes, so as to curb all 
disruptive impulses,· push civil society to the margins by 
massively expanding the scope of the state: business, 
banking, manufacturing, and farming all become state­
owned; educators become state· functionaries, as do clergy 
in extreme cases; and so forth. American civil society is 
subject to a good deal of government regulation--giving 
ground for much grumbling by those on the political right. 
But it is extraordinary how many of our institutions and 
organizations do not in any way belong to the government, 
and extraordinary how few of us are government 
employees. Equally striking is the vitality of our civil 
society--a ferment of new initiatives and new organizations 
of every imaginable sort. 
Education 
Fourth, the issue of academic freedom arises for us within 
the context of an educational system that, as a whole, is 
radically decentralized, full of voluntary organizations and 
activity, and highly competitive. 
Religion 
Fifth, it's important to recognize that the religion of many 
people in American society is what can best can be called 
"holistic." No doubt for some people, religion is no more 
than a sector of their lives--perhaps a very important sector, 
but a sector nevertheless, having little to do with the rest of 
their lives: little to do with their politics, their economic 
activity, their recreation, or their moral code. But there are 
many other people for whom religion is anything but a • 
sector; it decisively shapes their political and economic 
activity, how they rear their families, what they believe 
about the origins of life, about medicine, about the 
dynamics of the self, about the nature of justice and the 
benefits of freedom, and so forth. 
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The Academy 
Sixth, over the past twenty-five years or so there has been 
an upheaval in the regnant understanding of the academic 
enterprise. Perhaps the deepest component of the self­
understanding that dominated the academy before the 
upheaval was the conviction that well-formed learning is 
a generically human enterprise. To put the point 
pictorially: before entering the halls of learning, we were 
to render inoperative all our particularities--of gender, race, 
nationality, religion, social class, age, and so on--to allow 
only what belonged to our generic humanity to be operative 
within those halls. 
A second component in the once-dominant self­
understanding of the academy was a distinctive hierarchy 
among the academic disciplines. At the top were the 
physical science and mathematics; these were the 
paradigmatic disciplines. At the bottom were the 
humanities. The social science occupied an unsteady 
positions somewhere in between. Theology? If one 
thought of theology at all, the place one assigned it 
. depended on whether one judged it to be rationally 
grounded or not. If it was, it belonged somewhere among 
the humanities. If it wasn't, it was off the ladder at the 
bottom. 
Behind this hierarchy was a certain understanding of what 
constitutes the "logic" or methodology of well formed 
Wissenschaft. The thought was that mathematics and the 
natural sciences sat at the top of the hierarchy because they 
already exhibited the methodology of well-formed 
Wissenschaft. But that methodology was not unique in 
principle to them, it was the logic that any academic 
discipline would exhibit once it attained the status of a 
well-formed Wissenschaft. As to what the logic of a well­
formed Wissenschaft was, on that there was somewhat less 
consensus than on the other matters I have mentioned. 
Nonetheless, the dominant view was that the method of 
well-formed Wissenschaft was foundationalist--more 
specifically, classically foundationalist. 
Although this once-dominant self-understanding of the 
. modern Western academy has not disappeared, it has 
certainly been shaken, so much so that it is no longer the 
dominant understanding. I look on what happened as a 
"first revolution" and a "second revolution." First to go to 
. was the conviction that the logic of well-formed 
Wissenschaft is classical foundationalism. The emergence 
of metaepistemology, among philosophers, played a 
significant role in this development; when philosophers 
moved to the metalevel, they quickly recognized that 
classical foundationalism is but one of many options for 
structuring well-formed Wissenschaft, and not the most 
plausible. 
More decisive, however, was a quite different 
development. Around thirty years ago, a group of scholars 
trained as natural scientists, philosophers, and historians, 
began to study the episodes from the history of modem 
Western natural science to compare the dominant self­
understanding of natural science with actual practice. 
Thomas Kuhn became the most famous of these scholars. 
What they bumped up against over and over were . 
reputable, even admirable, episodes that simply did not fit 
the self-understanding of natural science as a classically 
foundationalist enterprise. One outcome of these 
discoveries was the breakup of the old hierarchy of the 
disciplines, which had been based on judgements about the 
degree to which a discipline exhibited the logic of well­
formed Wissenschaft. Now there was no longer consensus 
whether there was even such a thing as the logic, let alone 
on what it might be. 
That was the first revolution. The second revolution 
involved the repudiation of the conviction that well-formed 
academic learning is a product of our generic humanity. 
Historically, the academy in the modem West has been 
populated mostly by white European bourgeois males. 
Slowly, as a result of various liberation movements in 
society, its makeup has evolved, so that now significant 
numbers of the once-disenfranchised enjoy positions within 
the academy. Some twenty-five years ago, their numbers 
reached a critical mass, and they were emboldened to say 
what they had long felt if not thought, or thought if not 
said
., 
namely, that it is sheer pretense to present the learning 
of the academy as generically human in character. 
The learning of the academy is unavoidably particularist; 
it is best to acknowledge that, shed one's allusions, and act 
accordingly. The pluralization if the academy is not a 
matter of happenstance but of essence. Of course, there are 
degrees: literature, history, and philosophy are further from 
being generically human than are mathematics and natural 
science. 
Ideas 
A seventh thing to keep in mind when considering the 
question of academic freedom is that ideas matter to 
people. Different ideas matter to different people, but for 
everyone there are some ideas that matter. We all invest 
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ourselves in the world, and part of our investment is in the 
fate of certain ideas. Their fate, or their apparent fate, stirs 
up emotions in us. We get angry, discouraged, or disturbed 
when the ideas we treasure seem threatened; we feel 
jubilant when they appear to flourish. 
All of this is obvious: people care about ideas. I mention 
it only because I find it endemic among academics to act as 
if it is not true. More precisely, academics want members 
of the public to feel jubilation over their thoughts, but they 
don't want members of the public to feel anger over them. 
Academics want to be allowed to say and write whatever 
they wish with only positive consequences. Of academics 
alone should courage never be required. 
My response is: let's grow up! Stop being adolescent. 
People do care about ideas. We had better expect that 
people will sometimes get angry with what we say. 
Personhood 
Eight, and last, it is profoundly important for society to 
allow its scholars the duly qualified freedom to work out 
their thoughts as they see fit. How enormously 
impoverished, in multiple ways, humanity would be if no 
such freedom existed. How impoverished are those 
societies in which such freedom is absent. 
A reason of quite a different sort seems to me even more 
important. The abridgement of academic freedom 
constitutes a profound violation of the person, and in this 
world of ours, nothing is of greater worth than persons; 
correspondingly, no greater evil exists than the violations 
of persons. The violation of a person is the desecration of 
one of the images of God. The loss of that person's 
contribution may mean that the flourishing of humanity is 
somewhat diminished; much worse is the fact that an icon 
of the Holy One has been desecrated. 
DIVERSITY OF LEARNING 
Religiously affiliated colleges and universities all belong 
to the private sector of American society--to what I earlier 
called "civil society" --and the are multitudinous. The total 
number of students enrolled in such institutions is 
considerably less than the combined enrollment in state 
institutions and private secular institutions; nonetheless, 
there are hundreds of religiously based (and affiliated) 
institutions of higher education in this country. Their 
existence in such numbers is a prime manifestation of the 
extraordinary vitality of American civil society. In no 
other country in the world is there anything like it. 
This striking vitality and variety in the private educational 
sector, together with the fact that we live in a liberal 
democratic society (in which the state must refrain from 
inducting its citizens into any comprehensive perspective 
on God and the good), means that there is nothing an 
academic is free to teach in the public educational sector 
that she is not free to teach somewhere in the private 
educational sector. But the converse is not true: there are 
many things an academic in this country is free to teach 
somewhere in the private educational sector that she is not 
free to teach in the public sector. 
There is, in this respect, a great deal more academic 
freedom in the private sector of the American educational 
system than there is in the public sector. In discussions on 
academic freedom, this point is seldom made; yet it is 
indisputably true. In the private sector, one can explore 
and espouse religiously grounded lines of thought that one 
would not be able to explore or espouse in the public 
sector. The memory is fresh in my mind of a recent case at 
my own university, which, though not public, nonetheless 
sees itself as secular. A candidate for a post in religious 
studies was rejected because, some said, her lecture was 
too "confessional." 
It would be a tragedy of massive proportions if the 
extraordinary scope of academic freedom in the private 
sector of American education were in any way infringed 
on--if it were abridged or restricted. People like the 
candidate I just mentioned would be left without a teaching 
post unless they "shaped up." Some writers tend to think 
through the contours of duly qualified academic freedom 
for state. institutions and for secular private colleges, and 
they argue, or just assume, that those same contours ought 
to hold for all educational institutions. But imposing these 
contours would not only violate the personhood of many 
who teach in these private institutions, who believe with all 
their heart that they are called to live out their religious 
convictions in the academy instead of confining them to the 
familial and the ecclesiastical sectors; it would also 
impoverish our society by seriously diminishing the rich 
diversity of learning that the American educational system 
now produces. 
But if it is indisputably true that the private sector of 
American education, including religiously based 
institutions, offers freedom to a much wider variety of 
academic than does the public sector, why is it so 
commonly thought that religiously based institutions 
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uniquely threaten academic freedom? 
The answer to that question is pretty clear. I do think that 
it is important to compare, as I just did, the entire private 
sector of American higher education with the entire public 
sector on the matter of academic freedom. But one has to 
supplement that comparison of total sectors with talk about 
particular institutions; it is, after all, not sectors but 
institutions that hire professors, instruct students, and are 
governed by administrators. 
BOUNDARIES TO FREEDOM 
At most religiously based colleges and universities, a 
professor's standing in the institution depends in some way 
or other on the ideological content of what he or she says 
or publicizes on certain issues. And to a good many 
writers on the subject, that fact, all by itself, constitutes an 
unacceptable infringement of academic freedom. It will 
appear that way especially if one focuses on just one aspect 
of what goes on at state universities, neglecting the rest-� 
that is, if one focuses on the lack of official religious 
requirements for faculty at state institutions but fails to 
note that those some state universities have severe 
restrictions on what a professor may and may not teach 
with respect to religion. 
Earlier I made the point that just as legally qualified free 
speech governs our lives as citizens, rather than the 
unqualified affirmation of free speech that the U.S. Bill of 
Rights speaks of, so also it is duly qualified academic 
freedom that we have to deal with in our educational 
institutions. So the question is not whether it is acceptable 
for religiously based colleges and universities to attach 
qualifications to academic freedom. All educational 
institutions attach qualifications to academic freedom; none 
allows professors to teach whatever they wish. The 
question is whether attaching religious qualifications to 
academic freedom is inherently appropriate and, if it is not 
inherently appropriate, whether the form of such 
qualifications sometimes take makes them inappropriate. 
Ever since the founding of Harvard College, groups of 
people with shared religious convictions have joined 
together to found colleges that reflect their religion: a 
faculty gets assembled, students are enrolled, and a 
constituency is developed. The religion in 
question is almost always to some extent holistic; those 
who confine their religion to the distinct sectors of the 
familial and the ecclesiastical are much less inclined to 
found colleges than those who do not so confine their 
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religion. Colleges in the private sector also get formed for 
other than religious reasons: St. John's College, for 
example, was formed out of a secular vision of education 
as grounded in the Great Books. But far and away the most 
common foundations have been religious foundations. 
Almost invariably, when such a college gets founded, 
religious qualifications are attached to the academic 
freedom of the faculty. I see no reason for supposing that 
such qualifications are inherently wrong. I daresay we all 
agree that it is perfectly fine, in the context of American 
society, for a group of people to get together to form a 
Great Books college--even though such a college will not 
welcome those who think that an educational program 
based on the Great Books is a pack of nonsense. So why 
would it be wrong for a group of people to get together to 
form a college on one or another form of religion--even 
though such a college will not welcome those who think 
that species of religion is a pack of nonsense? Might the 
though be the Weberian idea that Wissenschaft must now 
follow its own internal dynamics, so that any influence 
from the side of religion is now intellectually 
irresponsible? This point might have had some plausibility 
before that upheaval in our understanding of learning 
occurred, but after the upheaval, it seems to me to have no 
plausibility whatsoever. 
I have argued for as double negative: it is not inherently 
inappropriate for a college or university to attach religious 
qualifications to the academic freedom of its faculty. Just 
as important, if not more so, so is this positive point: it 
would be a violation of the very idea of a liberal 
democratic society if a movement arose to prevent or 
restrict the formation of religiously based colleges and 
universities. To prevent or restrict their formation would 
violate freedom of religion, freedom of speech, and 
freedom of assembly. It is characteristic of totalitarian 
regimes to try and prevent private initiatives in education. 
But though religious qualifications on academic freedom 
are not inherently unacceptable in the American system, 
what must at once be added is that when we get down to 
the details--as we must--we find that religiously based 
colleges and universities do often illicitly infringe on 
academic freedom. No doubt about it. Whether they more 
often infringe on academic freedom that do state or secular 
private institutions, I do not know. 
Those who have taught at secular institutions would have 
to have their heads in the sand not to be aware of the extent 
to which ideological considerations, as distinct from 
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considerations of competence, enter in hiring, promoting, 
and firing. But be that as it may: duly qualified academic 
freedom is often egregiously infringed on in religiously 
based institutions. The infringements occur when the 
religious qualifications are applied unjustly: for example, 
when they are never fully stated, or not stated clearly at the 
time of appointment; when their application is arbitrary or 
irregular; or when their is no recourse available to the 
victim. 
Over the years, I have acquired a broad acquaintance with 
the religiously based colleges and universities of America. 
I have learned that the history of these institutions is 
littered with stories of unjust, often grossly unjust, 
infringements on academic freedom. The stories constitute 
a shameful blotch on the reputation of these colleges and 
universities and put into question the sincerity of those who 
profess high religious ideals for them. I defend the right of 
these colleges and universities to attach religious 
qualifications to academic freedom within their 
institutions. But I must, and will, add that all too often, 
they violate the personhood of their faculty members in the 
way they apply the qualifications. Often, the person 
violated is a brother or sister in the faith of those who 
perpetuate the violation. 
My own view, then, is that the best service the AAUP can 
continue to render to this teeming multitude of American 
institutions of higher education is to compose and 
recommend model codes of procedure for resolving issues 
of academic freedom. Almost always, it is in the 
procedure, not in the qualifications as such, that the 
injustice lies. Where there is no rule of law but only the 
command of persons, where secrecy and arbitrariness 
reign, where one never knows when and why the ax will 
fall, there justice weeps. 
Nicholas Wolterstorff is Noah Porter professor of Philosophical Theology at Yale University. 
UNEASY PARTNERS? RELIGION AND ACADEMICS 
Reprinted with permission from the January/February 2001 issue of Academe 
Storm Bailey 
As a group, religiously affiliated colleges are much like 
those with no religious connections. Some have a lot of 
money, but most get by on less. Some have wide name 
recognition; others enjoy a regional reputation or none at 
all. Some have sensitive and competent administrators 
who are on good terms with faculty, and some fall short of 
that blessed state. Some maintain high standards of 
academic excellence, but others achieve more modest (if 
not to say mediocre) levels of academic quality. 
Religiously affiliated institutions resemble their secular 
counterparts in these and other ways because they are 
subject to the same forces and circumstances that affect all 
of higher education. At the same time, however, the 
religious identity of these colleges has the potential to set 
them apart by making a distinct contribution to their 
character and quality. In the area of community life, for 
example institutional aspirations and policies are often 
explicitly linked to religious commitment or identity. 
My own college is one of twenty-eight institutions 
affiliated with the Evangelical Lutheran Church in 
America. These colleges see lives of service, the 
integration of values and practice, and the ideals of 
character and community as essential to their identity. 
Insofar as people on campus--in or outside the religious 
tradition--value such goals, pursuing them and achieving 
them will be perceived as adding to the college's quality. 
It is .not so surprising when the religious identity of a 
college or university is taken to contribute to its 
community life, but observers of higher education seem 
less likely to view religious commitment as integral to 
academic goals. Many·people see religion and academics 
as uneasy partners, if not completely at odds. This 
inclination shows itself when we think or speak of schools 
as being pretty good academically in spite of their church 
or religious affiliation. It is only fair to note that we have 
a good deal of evidence--historical and contemporary--to 
justify such reactions. But the question is whether such a 
state of affairs must be. Are there ways in which the 
religious commitments of colleges and universities can and 
do serve their academic aspirations? 
The answer to this question is yes on several grounds. 
Take, for example, the conception of service already 
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